SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our study is focussed on compliance with risk policy -the minimum standard required of finance professionals.
Incentives
Manager/Co-worker behaviour
Compliance with risk limits/policy Risk culture 1. Risk culture is an important determinant of compliance behaviour which is in turn affected by incentives and the behaviour of managers/co-workers. When managers/co-workers are profitfocused, and when incentives are linked to profits, rates of compliance fall. The effect is felt via risk culture.
2. Profit-based incentives are often used in financial services to encourage effort and boost profits. In our study profit-based incentives did not significantly boost the number of profitable investments. Given the significant adverse impact on compliance noted above, the study supports the elimination of profit-based incentives currently being debated within the financial services industry.
3. When we reduced the burden of calculations on participants we noticed an increase in compliance with risk policy. This is probably because people are less able to resist the temptation to breach policy when they are tired. This suggests that to increase risk compliance it is important for the industry to take better account of cognitive load -i.e. to automate analysis where possible and design work patterns in such a way that staff are not unduly depleted when making crucial decisions.
4. Personal attitudes to risk management/compliance are a significant determinant of compliance behaviour. This finding has implications for the screening of job candidates, such as considering candidates' attitudes towards risk management in recruitment/promotion decisions.
5. Workers from the superannuation sector were less likely than others in financial services to comply with risk policy. This finding should be treated with caution due to the small sample but it warrants further investigation. If confirmed, it may mean that additional work is need to improve risk culture in this sector.
6. The research project has demonstrated that 'culture' experiments can be usefully conducted in the lab. Subject to obtaining funding, we hope to extend the research to investigate how risk culture may be improved in financial institutions.
INTRODUCTION
In financial services these days, there is broad agreement that risk management is the responsibility of all staff, not just senior leaders and risk specialists. The first and primary risk management responsibility lies with those who trade securities and derivatives, manage assets, issue loans, advise clients, underwrite insurance and provide brokerage services. Their job is to take risk on behalf of their employer, subject to certain constraints or risk policies/limits.
For example, a proprietary trader or loan officer is allocated limits or boundaries constraining the amount and type of trades/loans (s)he can make. Financial advisors may be required to follow procedures designed to reduce the risk of selling products that are not well matched to customer needs, thus reducing the risk of future customer complaints, fines, legal consequences and reputational damage. All staff are expected to comply with policies designed to protect against cyber-attack such as not opening the attachments of suspect emails. While the importance of compliance with risk policy is clear, surprisingly little is known about compliance behaviour, and how this interacts with culture and incentives.
THE EXPERIMENT
We designed an experimental study to mimic investment decisions taken by bank executives e.g. buying securities, granting loans, underwriting insurance. The participants had to do some simple analysis (with a calculator) and then decide whether to invest. During the one-hour lab session, they could invest in up to 60 transactions.
The lab used by the participants in the study.
To reflect the industry context, the participants were given a risk policy/limit to follow. In the experiment, the risk policy/limit was set in terms of the maximum allowable loss on the transaction; so very risky investments (as defined by the risk limit) were forbidden, even if highly profitable.
Of the 60 transactions, 20 exceeded the risk limit. Participants were able to choose whether to comply or not. However, they knew that they would be penalised if they were caught investing in non-compliant transactions. They were also informed that 20% of transactions would be checked for compliance with policy.
With assistance from FINSIA (a professional membership body), we recruited finance professionals to participate in this study. We provided cash payments to participants immediately following the experiment, depending on their decisions. In the fixed payment groups participants received $120, less any penalties for non-compliance. In the incentive payment groups, participants received a 'commission' based on the expected value of all investments made, less any non-compliance penalties. In all cases we guaranteed a minimum payment of $50 for one hour participation. Overall the maximum payment was $193 and the average payment was $115. In recent years there has been a lot of discussion about the culture within financial institutions and how it might affect behaviour. By culture we mean the norms of behaviour -perceptions of what is expected. It is important to distinguish between what actually happens and policy statements; the 'is' versus the 'ought'. When new staff members join an organisation they don't study the procedure manual to learn how to behave; instead they learn from those around them. People look to the words and actions of managers and co-workers, especially when the team is under pressure to perform. Previous research suggests that staff discern the norms based on what gets rewarded, the words and actions of those they respect and admire in the workplace, what kind of behaviour builds status, the extent to which 'bad' behaviour is excused. All of this information creates a perception of the norm (= culture) which then influences behaviour.
To mimic these influences in the laboratory we used two types of framing: profit-focussed or risk-focussed. Participants who were assigned to the framing treatments received a short paragraph of text and a picture at the beginning of the experiment; this was repeated at regular intervals.
Profit Framing
In your workplace compliance with risk policy seems to have a low priority compared with meeting profit targets. Non-compliance is common. Your manager rarely mentions the risk policy but talks often about the need to meet budget. He is always giving you motivational messages to encourage you to boost profits. You notice that colleagues who breach policy are excused if they are top performers. Chance of Loss = 40%
Loss Amount = $250,000
Expected Profit is:
OK
The investment has 60% chance to gain $200,000 and 40% chance to lose $250,000. So the expected profits can be easily calculated: 60% x 200,000 -40% x 250,000 = 20,000.
This investment violates risk policy (the loss amount of $250,000 is more than the specified limit of $200,000). If you invest, then total expected profits will increase by $20,000. If you are caught (20% chance) then you will be penalised by 3 x $20,000 or $60,000.
So the overall expected value on the deal: $16,000 -$8,000 = $8,000.
Not caught
Caught 20% chance of $20,000 less penalty of $60,000 = 0.2 x ($20,000-$60,000) = -$8,000
80% chance of $20,000 = $16,000
or At the end of the experiment we asked participants to complete a short survey so we could understand and control for variables such as demographics and attitudes. We also asked them a crucial question about their perceptions:
Perception Question:
In the experiment you just completed, a number of investments were outside of risk policy because the Loss Amount exceeded $200,000. . We expected that this measure would predict how individuals behaved. In other words, people tend to behave in a way that they believe will be socially acceptable.
1.
You could argue that risk culture also captures norms regarding other types of risk behaviour like speaking up, but compliance with risk policy is a crucial aspect of risk management behaviour and arguably the minimum standard for finance professionals.
RESULTS
Comparing groups 1 and 2, we expected that group 2 (having profit-based incentives) would complete more transactions but would be less compliant with the risk policy. As shown in Table 2 , the proportion of people who always complied with risk policy decreased (from 68.6% to 42.3%) when incentives were introduced. Also fewer 'bad deals' were rejected (78.4% of the bad deals vs 85.9%). The average number of total investments increased from 28.4 to 30.3 but this was not enough to be statistically significant. This is a bit surprising, especially since the whole point of incentives is to encourage staff to work harder and benefit shareholders. But it is consistent with a recent report 2 which found that reducing profit-based incentives in the UK has not adversely affected business outcomes. It is also consistent with the possibility that finance professionals are intrinsically motivated to work hard so pay-for-performance (outside motivation) is not essential.
In groups 3 to 6 we introduced other elements into the equation i.e. risk and and profit framing. Remember that these are statements provided to participants with information about the behaviour of peers and managers.
We found that the profit framing had a powerful effect when combined with profit-based incentives. You can see this in Table 2 row (d). For Group 2 (incentives but no framing) the compliance rate per deal is 78.4%. When profit framing is combined with the incentives (Group 4) the compliance rate drops significantly to 63.7%. When risk framing is combined with the incentives (Group 5) the shift in the compliance rate to 82.9% is much smaller. The results suggest that the signals from managers/peers are most powerful in influencing behaviour when they are consistent with the incentive program. The final row of Table 2 (row e) displays perceptions of compliance. We treat this as a measure of risk culture because it measures expectations of compliance (with risk policy) by participants -the extent to which people in this group believe that compliance is 'the norm'. Notice that the highest perceptions of compliance occurred in Group 1 (fixed payment and no framing). The lowest perceptions of compliance related to Groups 4 and 6 (incentive payment and profit framing). All the groups with incentive payments had perceptions of compliance below 70%; we can infer that a culture that values compliance is fundamentally inconsistent with profit-based incentives.
In regression analysis (not reported here) we were able to demonstrate that the effect of incentives was felt through the channel of culture.
Comparing row (e) with row (c), notice that perceptions of compliance were always better than the reality (i.e. actual compliance in the lab!)
Finally, we decided to check whether the task of performing the calculations had any impact on the outcomes. Group 6 is a variation of Group 4 where participants were not required to calculate expected value; instead the expected value was given and participants had only to decide whether to invest. Not surprisingly, people in that group were able to enter into many more investments.
What is particularly interesting is that compliance rates in this group were significantly improved.
In row (d) we see the compliance rate jump from 63.7% (Group 4) to 72.7% (Group 6). This is consistent with previous research that has shown that people are better able to regulate themselves (resist temptation to cheat or break rules) when they are not tired or depleted. For example, people are much more likely to break a diet when they are tired.
A number of people in groups 1 to 5 told us that they found the experiment quite tiring even though the calculations themselves were simple. This may have made them less able to resist the temptation to earn extra cash by breaching risk policy. Note the similarity with financial services workplaces where people are under time pressure to complete analysis or other tasks while simultaneously making compliance choices.
OTHER FINDINGS REGARDING COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR
Incentives (through risk culture) seem to influence compliance behaviour, but we also checked to see if other factors might be important. Characteristics of the individual (such as age, personality, attitudes) were considered, along with characteristics of the investment (expected profit, risk) and characteristics of the workplace that each participant is drawn from. For example, if an individual works in an environment where compliance is not taken seriously, then this may have influenced his or her behaviour in the experiment. The table below summarises what we discovered. Those working in superannuation were significantly less likely to comply.
Gross income
What do you estimate your gross income will be from all sources this year (including the value of expected bonuses, allocations of shares and options, etc)? <$40,000, $40,000 to $80,000, $80,000 to $120,000, $120,000 to $160,000, $160,000 to $200,000, $200,000 to $300,000, $300,000 to $400,000, >$400,000; Decline to disclose.
No impact.
Individual risk tolerance (financial)
A set of five items that assess an individual's propensity to take financial risk in their life outside of work. E.g. how likely is it that you would:
> Invest 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock, > Bet a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event.
Individual attitude to risk/compliance A set of three items that assess an individual's personal attitude to risk/compliance in the finance industry. These are answered on a sliding scale, e.g. Risk management is: an unnecessary impediment to doing business versus an enabler for doing business.
Those with favourable attitudes to risk/ compliance were significantly more likely to comply.
Individual personality (conscientiousness)
A set of five items to assess the extent to which an individual has conscientious personality (this is one of the Big 5 personality variables) e.g. Do you agree/disagree with the following?
> I get chores done right away, > I like order.
Investment expected value
The expected value of the investment (recall that incentive payments in the experiment were based on expected value).
Compliance was reduced for investments with higher expected value.
